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Abstract 
Muslim, ex-Muslim as well as converted Muslim intellectuals are increasingly prominent 
figures in the West European far right movement. By analysing their publications and online 
presence, we observe that concepts utilized by Muslim-background intellectuals popular in the 
German far right build on two seemingly contradictory tropes of German national identity—
rationality and spirituality—and a civilizationism that oscillates between notions of rational 
liberalism and an illiberalism based on spiritualism. As these intellectuals combine the tropes of 
German nationhood and European civilisation, the far right builds connections with the growing 
Muslim demographic in Germany. The movement provides space for a variety of Muslim-
background intellectuals: those who embrace a secular-liberal self-description emphasize how 
rationalism is synonymous with Germanness, while those who embrace a religious self-
description critique liberal rationalism as lacking spirit. In so doing, Muslim public intellectuals 
help the far right to simultaneously spiritualize national reason and rationalize national spirit. 
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An increasing number of Muslims, ex-Muslims as well as white European converted 
Muslims are visibly present in the West European far right. In Germany, they appear not as mere 
fig leaves designed to paper over the movement’s racist façade. Through highly visible public 
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appearances, well-marketed books, and widely followed websites, they and their ideas have 
come to play an important role in the far-right movement and its discourse. Some of these 
intellectuals have openly embraced the far right or are part of established far right networks. 
Others have no direct links to the far right, yet their writings and ideas have proven popular 
among parts of the far right. In this article, we explore the place, function, and reception of born, 
ex, and converted Muslim public intellectuals in the German far right, which we conceive of as a 
broad social movement that expands beyond party politics (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018) to 
mobilize broader support (Caiani et al., 2012; Göpffarth, 2020a) for its white supremacist 
nativism (Mudde 2007, 19). 
Until recently, the West European far right’s efforts to gain acceptance have been inhibited 
by its association with fascism (Art, 2018) and overt racism (El-Tayeb, 2011; Chin et al., 2009). 
More recently the far-right caught up with the newer trends of framing anti-Muslim racism in 
terms of irreconcilable cultural and religious differences (Özyürek, 2005, Spielhaus, 2010, 
Shooman, 2014). Doing so parts of the  movement have managed to hide their crude forms of 
biologist racism (Ruza and Fella, 2009) in a  language of culture (Wodak, 2013) and to transform 
itself into a self-styled defender of a liberal-rational European civilization of Judaeo-Christian 
values (Topolski, 2016) against an illiberal-spiritual Islam (Doerr, 2017) and civilizational 
decline (Jones, 2013). 
To avert such a decline, far-right populist parties have assigned a central role to religion so 
as to construct “the people” as a redemptive community that overcomes past failings and present 
polarisation (Marzouki and McDonnell, 2016). Blurring the boundaries between the secular and 
the religious, the rational and the spiritual, a “secular, rational and modern people” is imagined 
as part of a superior secular European civilization rooted in a Judeo-Christian culture (Arato and 
Cohen, 2017: 288–91) and opposed to a Muslim other. The German far right is no exception to 
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this trend. Yet while parts of the movement embrace a rational-liberal “Christianist secularism”, 
other parts prefer a spiritual-illiberal civilizationism (Brubaker, 2017: 1193). 
Without doubt, the increasing presence of Muslim-background public intellectuals and 
their ideas in the German far right is related to legitimization efforts in this broader discursive 
shift from the assertion of racialised biological to the racialisation of cultural differences in 
civilisationism. The movement has been successful in opening itself to new demographics, even 
those it aims to exclude. Shortly after Jews for AfD (Alternative for Germany) was established, a 
group of immigrants within AfD started New Germans for AfD (Deutsche Welle, 2019). The 
number of Muslim-background intellectuals popular in the movement has been growing. Not 
only do their names appear in manifestos and social media postings. As we show in this article, 
some of their books have also become influential publications in far right networks. Their public 
activism, be it online or at debates and readings, has become a central part in the different 
currents of the German far right movement.  
Racialized Muslim background intellectuals that serve not the interests of their own 
communities but those who colonize or oppress them have been conceptualised by Edward Said 
(2003) as “native informants” and by Hamid Dabashi (2011) as “native informers.” Literary 
critic Graham Duncan (2001) named ethnic background culture producers in the West as “post-
colonial exotics” who market an authenticity they usually do not have. The intellectuals that we 
analyze here show some similarities to the native informants and informers discussed by Said 
and Dabashi in the sense that they claim an expertise that they do not necessarily have. On the 
one hand, this leads them to depicting themselves as first-hand victims of Islamic oppression 
(Shooman, 2014: 100) and embracing Germanness as a form of liberation. On the other hand, 
they depict themselves as seeing the true potential of Islam for a revived German nationalism. In 
both cases these white and non-white Muslim background intellectuals claim to speak as insiders 
of Islam to legitimize policies that further oppress and regulate Muslims who do not fit the 
 4 
 
visions of Germanness they propose. In this way they thus also differ from native informants and 
informers because rather than serve colonial/military projects outside the country, they help 
regulate the ways in which far-right as well as center-right nationalist movements draw the 
boundaries of the German nation. We suggest these intellectuals help German far-right 
movement define its own limits, differentiate among different strands within the movement, and 
legitimate itself.   
We observe that concepts utilized by Muslim-background intellectuals on or utilized by the 
far right build on two seemingly contradictory tropes of German national identity: rationality and 
spirituality. The positioning of Muslim-background intellectuals in relation to these tropes 
reflects the double-faced character of the German far right’s civilizationism, which oscillates 
between notions of rational liberalism and an illiberalism based on spiritualism. In both forms, 
European civilization and its rational or spiritual “people” are ingrained as the essential ethno-
culture with which Islam is viewed either as compatible or incompatible, idealized or demonized. 
We argue that, on the one hand, Muslim public intellectuals’ ability to rise in the movement 
depends on the connections they build between these seemingly contradictory tropes of German 
nationhood and European civilization. At the same time, the further expansion of the far right 
depends on its ability to establish connections with Muslims, a growing and increasingly visible 
demographic group in Germany. The movement provides space for a variety of Muslim-
background intellectuals: those who embrace a secular-liberal self-description emphasize how 
rationalism is synonymous with Germanness; those who embrace a religious self-description 
critique liberal rationalism as lacking spirit. In so doing, Muslim public intellectuals help the far 
right to simultaneously spiritualize national reason and rationalize national spirit. 
Rationality versus Spirituality Reconsidered 
Since its founding in 2013, the AfD’s initially dominant (ordo)liberalism has been 
complemented by illiberal currents (Göpffarth, 2017). While the (ordo)liberal trend imagines the 
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German people as carriers of Western rational individualism, liberalism, and secularism, the 
illiberal current embraces a spiritual-communitarian notion of the nation. These two faces of the 
AfD specifically and the German far right more generally echo two senses of German self-
understanding that are often seen as contradictory: Germanness-as-rationality and Germanness-
as-spirituality. Both models have deep historical roots: the first is embedded in a rationalist-
modernist liberalism with origins in the French Revolution (Breuilly, 1990); the second in a 
spiritual-traditionalist illiberalism formed in reaction to Napoleonic imperialism (Schulze, 1985) 
and early capitalism (Redding, 2011). 
After Germany’s defeat in WWII, German intellectuals and American occupiers 
established a direct link between the spiritual-illiberal tradition of nationalism and National 
Socialism (Stern, 1975; Mosse, 1964). They selectively embraced desirable elements of the 
German past such as the “Weberian liberal tradition” (Kurlander, 2006: 2) and helped establish a 
democratic and socially inclusive West German liberalism as essentially distinct and in 
opposition to the exclusive ethnonational spiritual tradition (Forner, 2014: 6–10). East Germany 
was painted as a residue of pre-war irrationalism that had left spiritual notions of Volk (people) 
and Heimat (homeland) intact (Palmowski, 2009), combining them with the idea of class 
(Fulbrook, 1999) and socialist progress (Kolinsky and Van Der Will, 1998). 
Although this reductive spiritual-rational dichotomy has become the ingrained political 
understanding of the purported nature of German nationalism, it veils the shared historical 
acceptance of both tropes among intellectuals along the entire political spectrum. Before WWII, 
the German left and right were heavily impacted by an anti-capitalist spiritualism: the left 
advocated communism, and the right a “nostalgic and religious commitment to the pre-modern 
‘organic’ state” (Redding, 2011: 19). After the war, spiritualism underpinned the critique of 
liberalism in both the New Right and the New Left. The New Right expressed a desire for a 
nationalism that would go “beyond left and right” and a need for the “‘recovery of history’ as the 
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precondition of national self-confidence” (Müller, 2000: 214). The New Left embraced a neo-
nationalism (Betz, 1988) that drew on postcolonial discourses that portrayed Germany as having 
been colonized by Western powers (Müller, 2000: 215). Both currents subscribed to the idea of 
an ethnically and culturally homogenous Germany viewed as under threat by a universalist 
order—capitalist imperialism for the left, multiculturalism for the right, technological progress 
for both. 
But the opposition between progressive rationalist liberalism and regressive spiritual 
illiberalism has never been clear-cut. National Socialism went hand in hand with modern 
technology and rationalism (Herf, 1986). German liberalism has a strongly racialist and 
nationalist past (Langewiesche, 1999). Phenomena today associated with liberal rationalism, 
such as the Bauhaus movement, were closely linked to racialist and spiritual conceptions of 
Germanness (Linse, 2017). Ordoliberalism, the post-WWII German tradition of social liberalism 
that sees state involvement as necessary to ensure that free markets work as they should, is 
strongly embedded in racialist thinking and the idea that Europe is the only true space for 
civilized democratic politics (Slobodian, 2019: 146–181). 
Despite these overlaps, the Germanness-as-rationality trope has dominated the liberal 
nationalism of post-reunification Germany (Fuchs et al., 2011) based on pride in economic 
achievement, allegiance to the German Constitution (Habermas, 2009), the working through of 
the Nazi past (Wittlinger, 2008), and in distinction to East German (Berdahl, 1999; Glaeser, 
2000; Kalmar and Shoshan, 2020) and Muslim “others” portrayed as having not yet progressed 
to the stage of liberalism (Özyürek, b2019). More recently, both East and West German 
intellectuals have been drawing on anti-Muslim racist repertoires to discursively build a new, 
sanitised post-reunification notion of Germanness. Based on the self-image of a progressive, 
enlightened and secular nation this nation building has been aiming at redeeming and 
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overcoming past guilt linked to the holocaust as well as polarisations between an East and West 
German identity (Lewicki & Shooman, 2019).  
The figure of German-as-rational and hence secular appeared in opposition to the figure of 
the regressive and illiberal Muslim. As Schirin Amir-Moazami argues, this secular model of 
nationhood accepts the spiritual and religious only as a private affair and as an object of 
individual choice rather than of a collective national identity displayed in public (Amir-
Moazami, 2016: 156). In this framework, the public display of emotions as well as formulation 
of religious and spiritual claims need to be clad in a secular and rational vocabulary and not 
challenge the primacy of secular reasoning. The naturalised character of the rationality-trope, in 
opposition to a regressive spiritual other veils the Christian legacy it is built on (Asad, 1993). 
The intellectuals we analyse here either reassert or challenge the rational-liberal trope. Those 
who assert it draw on the unmarked religious legacy of secularism and spiritualize a rational 
understanding of nationhood. Those intellectuals who challenge the rational-liberal trope, on the 
other hand, go against the idea of rational-liberal nationhood call for a collective spirituality 
either through the reassertion of an explicitly Christian nationhood or the fusion of a collective 
spiritual Germanness with Islam. Despite following different tropes of Germanness both groups 
share the quest for a redemptive and purified vision of Germanness that overcomes past 
divisions, feelings of guilt, and present polarisation.  
Muslim-background Intellectuals and the German Far Right 
The Muslim background intellectuals we analyse in this article either have established 
direct links to the far right or have become figures of reference in the far right.  They are of 
Turkish, Kurdish, Arab (Egyptian, Palestinian, Lebanese), Pakistani, Macedonian, Iranian, 
Albanian, and German background. They are men and women, young and old, atheist and devout 
believer; recent immigrants, second or third generation, and native; lawyers, social workers, 
psychologists, university professors, authors, and publicists; on the left, centre, and right ends of 
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the political spectrum. They have differing but equally strong opinions about what the 
fundamentals of German identity are and what kinds of Islam and Muslims do and do not suit it. 
The intellectuals and/or the ideas used by these intellectuals build on the ingrained rationalist and 
spiritualist tropes of German identity and help to make themselves more visible within the 
movement and/or to mobilize broader legitimacy and support for it. The inherent ambiguities and 
entanglements of the two competing tropes of Germanness-as-rationality and Germanness-as-
spirituality allow these seemingly marginal intellectuals to simultaneously speak to both the 
illiberalism and the liberalism that are active on the far right. The quick solutions they provide to 
the German Muslim question open up new and often radical ideas about folding certain kinds of 
Muslims or Islam into the German nation while excluding other kinds. Their presence on the far 
right and their rejection of Islam serves to legitimate the movement’s racist discourses and 
practices. 
In what follows, we analyse the writings of fourteen Muslim-background intellectuals who 
are either active protagonists of the German far right or whose ideas have been picked up by it. 
We chose these individuals for two reasons: 1) their presence at sponsored events, their 
contributions to far-right publications, and their influential websites and channels make them 
currently the most visible Muslim-background intellectuals in the movement and 2) they 
represent a variety of positions currently visible in the movement.  
Our most important insights build on ethnographic field research conducted separately 
among German converts to Islam (Özyürek, 2009, 2014) and German far-right intellectual circles 
(Göpffarth, 2020a; 2020b). Yet, for this article we also systematically analysed the public 
writings of all Muslim background, ex-Muslim, or converted Muslim public intellectuals that 
appear in an emerging network of far-right websites and platforms, publishing houses, think 
tanks and broader networks (Göpffarth, 2020b). We looked at online and print publications such 
as Compact, Tumult, Sezession, Junge Freiheit, Tichy’s Einblick, Achse des Guten, Epoch 
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Times as well as social media posts by regional and national AfD actors and networks. We also 
analysed publications promoted or published by known far right publishers such as 
Manuscriptum and Antaios. We were able to locate 14 such intellectuals. It is likely that there are 
many more such public figures that are influential in local settings but do not reach to larger 
audiences. 
We read all the publicly available writings, listened to recorded interviews, and browsed 
twitter posts of all intellectuals we were able to identify. We were able to do this comprehensive 
research based on the entire sample due to the relatively small number of the intellectuals we 
were able to identify. We made several attempts to categorize their approaches to German 
nationalism. We finally settled on a four-celled chart that located them on the axis of their 
closeness to Germanness-as-rationality and Germanness-as-spirituality and whether they see 
Islam and Germanness as compatible. As we discuss in the article the boundaries among the cells 
are not very clearly defined and some statements of the public figures can be located in another 
cell of the chart as well. However, when looking at the totality of the statements of each 
individual, we were able to confidently locate them in one of the four cells of our chart.  
Through their prominent positions or the popularity of their ideas in the movement their 
ideas actively shape the notions of Germanness the far right draws on to mobilise broader 
support. We identify four distinct networks of Muslim-background intellectuals who use the 
tropes of spiritualism or rationalism to imagine a German nation/European civilization. In the 
first two networks we look at how Seyran Ateş, Ahmad Mansour, Zana Ramadani, Necla Kelek, 
and Hamed Abdel-Samad draw on the Germanness-as-spirituality trope to claim the 
incompatibility or compatibility of Islam with a hegemonic liberal notion of Germanness. In the 
last two networks we analyse how Abu-Bakr Rieger, Muhesir Sebastian Hennig, Eren Güvercin, 
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Feridun Zaimoğlu, Sabatina James, Feroz Khan, and Akif Pirinçci mobilise the Germanness-as-
spirituality trope to either in- or exclude Islam in a sanitised vision of illiberal German identity.  
Germanness-as-Rationality 
A significant number of Muslim-background public intellectuals depict a stark 
civilizational opposition between the West and the East, portraying Germany as the embodiment 
of rational Western modernity and Islam as the expression of an Eastern irrational barbarity. 
Intellectuals such as Seyran Ateş, Ahmad Mansour, Zana Ramadani, Necla Kelek, and Hamed 
Abdel-Samad embrace mainstream narratives of a liberal and rational German nationhood 
representative of a West European rationalism. In their books, they combine autobiography and 
accounts of their individual paths to a rational liberalism with subjective analysis of Muslim 
culture (Kelek, 2005; Ateş, 2006; Ramadani, 2017; Abdel-Samad, 2010) and subscribe to the 
Germanness-as-rationalism trope to demonstrate how Muslims can leave their irrational culture 
and religion behind and embrace a rational German identity. They emphasize the differences 
between Islamic and Western/German lifestyles and argue that Muslims can embrace Western 
values and customs as individuals either by radically transforming Islam or by leaving it behind 
altogether. 
Muslim-background intellectuals in this category are highly visible in mainstream media 
and are granted prestigious awards or invited to the Islam Conference.1 They are given 
influential advisory positions in government relating to immigrants and Muslims. Their views 
resonate with the newer post-racist, rationalist, civilizationist trends popular in the German far-
right conservative parts of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union, but also with liberal and 
 
1 Continuing today, the Islamkonferenz was initiated in 2006 by the German 
government with the aim to “promote the rapprochement between the German state and 
Muslims” (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, 2010).  
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left critics of Islam and immigration, including parts of the Liberal Democrats and the Left 
Party’s Aufstehen movement. 
Although those who see Germanness as a fundamentally liberal, democratic, and rational 
identity concur that contemporary Muslim practices are irreconcilable with German identity, the 
first conciliatory network we analyse argues that Islam can be radically reformed to fit into the 
fold of the rational German nation if Muslims emulate Germany’s historical progression from 
illiberal irrationalism to liberal rationalism. In contrast, the second network claims that to be 
integrated into Germany, Muslims must leave Islam behind. In both cases, the changes required 
from Islam and Muslims are so radical that it is unrealistic to expect large numbers of Muslims 
to meet their criteria. 
Network 1: Islam and Germanness Are Compatible 
Intellectuals such as Seyran Ateş and Ahmad Mansour explicitly describe themselves as 
Muslims and promote a radical reform of Islam. They both have a background in the German 
New Left and have the weakest ties to the far right. While they do not openly embrace the 
movement and may at times publicly criticize it, they do participate in far-right events and are 
highly popular points of reference in the movement. Their primary argument is that Muslim and 
German identities are compatible if Muslims radically reform their belief system and adapt their 
ways to suit a superior German rationality. They see themselves not only as liberal but also 
liberated Muslims whose individual life stories demonstrate that Muslims can be assimilated into 
German identity on condition that they leave their families, culture, and fundamentals of belief 
behind. They promote the idea that Germanness is something that can be adopted by retracing 
the historical steps Germans have tread; for example, through the 1968 sexual revolution 
(Mansour, 2014; Ateş, 2011) or the Christian reformation (Ramadani, 2017). 
Seyran Ateş, a Turkish-background lawyer formerly on the radical left who fights for 
immigrant women’s rights, is the most visible member of this network. With the encouragement 
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of the former minister of interior affairs, Wolfgang Schäuble, she recently established the 
reformed, gender-neutral Ibn Rushd-Goethe mosque in Berlin, declaring herself an imam (Ateş, 
2017c). She has since been under attack by conservative Muslims and highly appreciated and 
supported by the German far right as a model for German Islam (AfD Potsdam, 2017; Breitbart, 
2017). She was publicly invited to join the AfD (Breyton, 2018). In the Gemeinsame Erklärung 
2018 declaration, where far-right public intellectuals like Thilo Sarrazin positioned themselves 
against an “illegal mass immigration,” Ateş was named as a preferred choice for a commission to 
restore “lawful order at the borders” (Fetscher, 2018). Despite distancing herself from the AfD 
(Ateş, 2017a), she supports the party’s stance on limiting immigration and Islamization (Ateş, 
2017b) and, together with ex-FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache, participated in an event 
organized by the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) about the threat of political Islam 
(FPÖ, 2018). 
Ahmad Mansour is a Palestinian-background Israeli who migrated to Germany in 2006 to 
finish his studies in psychology. Mansour became well known through affiliation with political 
education projects that trained young male Muslims on gender equality, anti-Semitism, and 
radicalization prevention (Özyürek, 2019). Affiliated with the Green Party, he wrote several op-
eds with its Turkish-background leader, Cem Özdemir. Despite his formal disengagement, 
Mansour is highly appreciated by the far right, is presented as a champion in the fight against 
anti-Semitism and Islamism (Masson, 2018; Werner, 2018) and has participated in debates with 
prominent far-right public intellectuals (Leh, 2019). 
The third public intellectual in this network is Zana Ramadani, an Albanian-background 
lawyer and Christian Democratic Union politician whose parents arrived in Germany as 
Yugoslav refugees when she was young (Ramadani, 2017). As one of the founders of the 
German branch of the Ukrainian radical feminist group Femen, known for their topless protests 
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against religious institutions, sexism, and homophobia, Ramadani now regularly contributes to 
German far-right blogs such as Die Achse des Guten (Ramadani, 2017). 
Both Mansour and Ateş present themselves as Muslims, and Ramadani as an atheist, but all 
three promote the idea that, through radical reform, Islam and Muslims can become an integral 
part of a rational and secular German society. Their books and the declarations they have co-
signed alongside other secular or humanistic Muslims—the Berlin Declaration of the Muslim 
Forum spearheaded by Ahmad Mansour and the Freiburg Declaration of Secular Muslims—
describe how Islam is to be reformed: Muslims should not take the Quran as the word of God but 
rather as a historical document; accept the equality of genders; deny violence; stand against anti-
Semitism, homophobia, and hatred of the West; publicly declare that they submit to the German 
Constitution (Freiburger Deklaration, 2016). In her Ibn Rushd-Goethe mosque, Ateş has 
abolished gender segregation, discourages women from covering their hair, and bans burqa-
wearing (Samuels, 2017). 
Common to the recommendations of reformist Muslim intellectuals in this network is the 
belief that German identity can be adopted if Muslims emulate the historical progression of 
German society. Ateş and Mansour believe that, to be liberated and to overcome a sexually 
repressed, patriarchal, and authoritarian Muslim identity that is in direct opposition to German 
democratic culture, Muslims must repeat the 1968 German sexual revolution for themselves. In 
their view, obedience to parents, gender segregation, and bans on premarital sex prevent 
Muslims from becoming mature citizens ready for democracy (Ateş, 2011, 87) and drive them 
towards Islamist radicalization (Mansour, 2014, 129). Ramadani goes so far as to suggest that 
Muslim immigrants and refugees should repeat the steps of German reformers of the fifteenth 
century and unreservedly reform their faith (Ramadani, 2017, 247). 
Another idea promoted by this network is that Germans have overcome their Nazi past and 
should simply stop feeling guilty about it (Yıldız, 2011; Ewing, 2008). Concentrating on past 
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guilt drives Germans to apply “false tolerance” (Ramadani, 2017; Ateş, 2019) towards minorities 
and especially Muslims. Such a vision sits well with the German far right’s calls to move on 
from guilt and build national confidence instead. It idealizes and sacralizes German history, 
presenting it as the ultimate expression of progress that other groups should repeat. Embracing 
such a trope enables the German far right to present itself as a liberal and secular movement that 
does not exclude people based on race, thereby generating support within both the right-liberal 
and left-liberal mainstream. Following the European far right’s broader civilizational shift, it 
rebrands the German far right as a defender of a redemptive rational-liberal nation and a 
European civilization based not on essentialised racial but cultural differences. 
Network 2: Islam and Germanness Are Incompatible 
The second network of Muslim-background intellectuals we analyse also promotes the idea 
that a Western civilization-based German identity is superior to Islam. What differentiates the 
second network from the first is its harsher interpretation of the clash-of-civilizations perspective 
and the view that Islam and the West are at war. Protagonists of this network such as Necla 
Kelek, Hamed Abdel-Samad, and Imrad Karim aim to have left Islam behind and indicate their 
individually chosen paths as the only ones available for Muslims to become German. They 
openly embrace the AfD, have appeared in print alongside central figures of the German far 
right’s liberal-civilizationist current such as Thilo Sarrazin and Birgit Kelle (Plickert, 2017), and 
have published their own bestselling books (Kelek, 2005; Abdel-Samad, 2010). These 
intellectuals regularly participate in far-right events, contribute to the far-right media, and are 
actively utilized by the AfD as sources to legitimize policy choices on immigration (Petry, 2017; 
AfD NRW, 2017). 
Turkish-background sociologist Necla Kelek is the leading public intellectual in this 
network. In her bestselling books The Foreign Bride (2005) and The Lost Sons (2006), Kelek 
positions herself as an insider to Turkish/Muslim culture and promotes the idea that the 
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differences separating Europe and Islam are unbridgeable. She claims that Islam is not a belief-
system but is a declaration of war on European civilization (Kelek and Horn, 2010). 
Manifestations of Islam such as headscarves or mosques are therefore not aspects of religious 
freedom but symbols of invasion. If Muslims are to be integrated into German society, they must 
leave Islam behind one by one and fully commit to German society: “An individual Muslim can 
be integrated into German society. Islam cannot” (European Stability Initiative, 2010: 8). The 
notion of individual choice and allegiance to a collectively shared notion of liberalism in contrast 
with an essentially collectivist Islam is central to her narrative. 
Egyptian-background political scientist Hamed Abdel-Samad concurs with Kelek that 
Islam is not a religion but a political ideology, going so far as to claim that Islam is the original 
fascist ideology. In his international best seller Islamic Fascism, Abdel-Samad argues that the 
Muslim Brothers are ideological and historical precursors to Nazism in that, far from having 
learned fascism from the Germans, Muslims had in fact invented it themselves in 632 after the 
death of Muhammad (Abdel-Samad, 2016). His conclusion is that Islam and Europe are 
irreconcilable because Islam is not reformable. Imrad Karim, a Lebanese-background filmmaker 
and official AfD member, argues that Germany “cannot and should not” integrate immigrants 
because Muslims have always been violent, aim to Islamize the whole world, and threaten the 
path of progress Germany has taken since WWII (Karim, 2018). Both intellectual’s ideas are in 
line with the far-right struggle to free German identity from fascism and to externalize it onto 
Islam. Fascism is here the symbol for an illiberal collectivist past that contemporary Germany is 
deemed to have overcome. 
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As rationalists, members of this network do not define themselves as Muslim, and some 
openly declare their break with Islam.2 In contrast with most atheists, however, they emphasize 
Christianity’s superiority to Islam and its role as the basis of German/European civilization. For 
Necla Kelek, the problem with Islam is that its intrinsic authoritarianism is directly opposed to 
Christianity’s message of “love and hope” (Kelek, 2006, 22). Although these intellectuals invoke 
the trope of a secular European civilization under threat by an illiberal and fascist Islam, Kelek’s 
(and Ramadani’s) references to Christianity reveal the centrality of a secularized Christian 
identity that appeals to the far right’s civilizationalist approach. Kelek’s reference to “love” and 
“hope” reveals how discourses of passion and affect can underpin secular notions of individual 
freedom (Asad, 2006). Spiritual claims are acceptable if they are clad in a vocabulary of 
individual liberalism. 
Both networks one and two define Germanness as rationality and foreground the idea of a 
secular-liberal civilization. But they blur the rational and spiritual arguments by sacralizing a 
German identity based on reason and an individual path towards liberation from an oppressive 
collective. They make use of quasi-religious narratives of redemption by arguing that becoming 
German means embracing Western so-called civilizational and liberal values. In this narrative 
becoming Germany requires either Islam’s complete reform or its complete repudiation. In this 
process the Christian (Protestant) legacy of the trope of rationality and its vision of an 
individualized and privatised spirituality becomes apparent. The demonisation of collective 
forms of spirituality here goes hand in hand with the elevation of a secular nationhood to an 
abstract norm based on which individual religious claims must be clad in a vocabulary of 
rationality. 
 
2 Abdel-Samad in My Farewell to Islam (2010), Kelek in The Lost Sons (2006), and 
Ramadani in The Veiled Danger (2017) all declare that they have broken with Islam.  
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Germanness-as-Spirituality 
The next two networks of Muslim-background intellectuals we analyse define Germanness as a 
spiritual concept. Compared to the first two networks, they are less visible both in the 
mainstream and on the far-right itself. Nevertheless, they have gained increasing visibility and 
influence in those far right elite circles that support more collectivist notions of nationhood. They 
speak to those far-right networks that oppose liberal rationalism and individualism and that are 
critical of the far right’s recent liberal-civilizationist shift. Contrary to the first two networks who 
idealize rationalism as the root of German identity, the third and fourth networks perceive 
rationalism as a serious “threat to European civilization” in that it empties the continent of its 
“Christian spirit” and leaves it faithless. Unlike the first two networks, which embrace a secular 
and individualist approach to life and religion, the last two attribute wider powers to religion and 
see it as a collectively shared source of resistance to globalization, capitalism, and liberalism, 
which deprive the “European way of life” of its meaning. While network three sees Islam as an 
opportunity to mobilize a nationally rooted resistance culture, network four sees Islam as a threat 
that thrives on Europe’s spiritual void. All four networks aim at a symbolically essentialised, 
sanitised and idealised national identity. Yet they differ in their visions on what forms the 
essence of this nationhood. Networks one and two see the integration into Germanness as an 
individually performed and chosen path to an essential secular-rational norm that veils yet 
simultaneously reifies its Christian legacy. Networks three and four see spirituality as a legacy 
that is not a matter of choice but a pregiven tradition that has to be revived, defended and 
asserted as part of a collective identity. 
Network 3: Islam and Germanness Are Compatible 
Muslim intellectuals such as Abu-Bakr Rieger, Muhesir Sebastian Hennig, Eren Güvercin, 
and Feridun Zaimoğlu occupy a small but increasingly discussed niche in the German far right 
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which promotes the view that the spiritual potential of Islam can further a spiritual sense of 
Germanness. While some of them have or have had direct links to the far right (Rieger, Hennig) 
others (Güvercin, Zaimoğlu) have seen their ideas being picked up by influential far right 
intellectuals. Affiliated largely with the Al-Murabitun movement3 and organized around Die 
Islamische Zeitung, a German-language newspaper focusing on politics, culture, and theology 
from an anti-globalization perspective (Kuppinger, 2011), these intellectuals idealize Goethe as 
the first to have synthesized the German and Muslim spirits. 
The merging of Islamic and German identities has a long history. After WWI, Islam 
emerged as a source of German renewal for both liberal-rationalist and illiberal-spiritualist 
politics. Fusing protestant ethics, the Enlightenment, and romanticism in a German–Islamic 
synthesis, Weimar intellectuals such as Jewish-Muslim convert Hugo Marcus saw in Islam “the 
most modern, progressive, advanced, and rational of religions” in the tradition of Goethe, Hegel, 
and Kant (Baer, 2017: 174); conversion to Islam helped redefine and retain a spiritual 
Germanness in the name of progress (Baer, 2017: 184). Later, Nazi leaders idealized Islam as a 
soldierly religion and source of spiritual renewal against what they saw as a Jewish-led 
rationalistic modernity” (Motadel, 2014). After the war, generations of German converts to Islam 
believed that by becoming Muslim one could become a better German (Özyürek, 2014). Both 
strands shared the conviction of an essential affinity, either rationalist or spiritual, between 
Germanic and Islamic culture and a Nietzschean critique of Christian morality as self-denying, 
meek, and artificial. 
 
3 Al-Murabitun is a Sufi Muslim suborganization that unites many German converts 
and aims to unite Muslim and German spirituality. 
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German convert Andreas Abu-Bakr Rieger, founder of Die Islamische Zeitung,4 states that 
converting to Islam was a way for him to start a revolution without leaving his Catholic 
conservatism behind (Lau, 2004: 3). A self-defined Muslim anti-capitalist, Rieger’s group calls 
for a “jihad against the market society” (Lau, 2004: 3). In his conception of Islam, Rieger draws 
on anti-modernist German thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, and Ernst Jünger who 
form part of the German far right’s ideological canon (Sedgwick, 2019; Göpffarth, 2020). The 
proximity of Rieger’s ideas to the far right is reflected in his having co-founded the magazine 
Compact together with Jürgen Elsässer, a former communist activist. Although Rieger later left 
the magazine in reaction to its increasingly anti-Muslim stance, Compact has become one of the 
leading German far right magazines. 
German convert Muhesir Sebastian Hennig is strongly influenced by Rieger. Formerly a 
regular contributor to Die Islamische Zeitung, the Dresden-based painter has recently gained 
prominence through his contributions to far-right publications and books on the far-right political 
movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) (Hennig, 
2015a, 2017, 2018) and a book co-authored with AfD politician Björn Höcke (Höcke and 
Hennig, 2018). In his articles, Hennig points out the mutual influences of “Orient and Occident” 
(Hennig, 2015b). While he criticizes leftist-liberalism for its denial of roots and borders and for 
having paved the way for a homogenizing globalization, he idealizes Pegida’s nationalism and 
Islam’s spiritualism as tools with which to counter German self-hate and a globalizing liberal 
nihilism (Hennig, 2015a, 30–31, 48). In merging German nationalism and Islam, he sees an 
opportunity to strengthen spiritual Germanness and to root Islam in Germany. 
 
4 Abu-Bakr Rieger is also the founder of the Weimar Institute, which aims to bring 
German Muslims and the classical spiritual tradition of Weimar together. 
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Conservative Muslim-born intellectuals such as Eren Güvercin and Feridun Zaimoğlu are 
equally influential for Hennig. Hennig shares their Islam-based critique of liberal-secular far-
right protagonists such as Thilo Sarrazin, arguing that liberalism neglects the need of human 
communities for a spiritual base (Güvercin, 2012, 10). The protagonists of this network also 
reject Islamism as an “Arabization of German Islam” and propose instead a proud embrace of 
German patriotism and Islam (Güvercin, 2012, 25). To realize this goal, Güvercin founded the 
Alhambra Society, whose name symbolically underlines the European roots of Islam (Stoldt, 
2018). 
The ideas presented by this network resonate across a milieu that reaches from 
conservative German converts to born Muslims yearning for the reconciliation of a strong 
German Muslim identity. Still marginal, this network is often met with hostility: when presenting 
his book on Pegida in a Dresden far-right salon, members of the audience left when Hennig 
revealed that he was Muslim (Sachsen Depesche, 2015). Nevertheless, parts of the illiberal far 
right and its elites are increasingly open to the spiritual potential of Islam. Influential far-right 
intellectuals close to the illiberal Institut für Staatspolitik such as Benedikt Kaiser and Thor von 
Waldstein or to platforms such as Jungeuropa Verlag argue that the reality of contemporary 
Germany as a multiethnic society and the undeniable presence of Islam calls for a shift from the 
perception of Islam as “threat” to “opportunity”. Following French far-right intellectuals such as 
Alain Soral these intellectuals see Islam as a potential ally against a “hedonistic left liberalism” 
and cultural decline (Eichberger, 2019). They share the far right’s general stance against 
immigration, which they see as yet another expression of an uprooted liberal universalism in the 
form of multicultural global capitalism. But contrary to most on the far right, they oppose a 
binary between a “free West” and an “unfree Islam” (Kaiser, 2019). Instead they underline 
Islam’s potential as a spiritual basis for values, identity, and community (Schwarzenberger, 
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2009) and argue that a Muslim, values-based Europe would be preferable to a spiritless Europe 
dominated by American capitalism and individualism (Von Waldstein, 2018). 
Representatives of this network claim that Christian and Muslim conservatives share a 
belief in a transcendental power, a collective rootedness in a homeland, and the primary 
importance of the family, values they claim secular liberals want to destroy. This network 
presents arguments inverse to network one: it romanticizes Islam as a spiritual entity that has not 
yet been “brainwashed” by post-war rationalism, liberalism, or the 1968 movement. This vision 
of a de-spirited German society opens up space for an Islamo-German alliance against the 
common enemy of a liberal, capitalist, and secular mainstream (Güvercin, 2012). 
Network 4: Islam and Germanness Are Incompatible 
Network three’s idea of a Germano-Muslim alliance is not, however, appreciated by the 
entire illiberal German far right. Other anti-modernist, anti-rationalist, anti-capitalist 
intellectuals, some of whom have a Muslim background, argue that the German spirit needs to be 
strengthened in order to counter, not to embrace Islam. Representatives of this network such as 
Sabatina James, Feroz Khan, and Akif Pirinçci use their Muslim backgrounds to warn Germans 
against a Muslim invasion (James, 2015; Kaiser, 2016; Khan, 2018a). They concur that Germany 
would be unable to stand up against a strong Muslim identity due to its lack of self-love and self-
respect and its overemphasis of the dark sides of its history (Khan, 2018b). Like networks one 
and two, the protagonists of network four all write and talk about the personal journey that 
allowed them to shed their Muslim identity to join Germany’s national community. Their 
celebration of the German nation has made them popular among far right elites representing both 
the illiberal and liberal currents in the German far right movement.5 
 
5 See for example Khan’s interview with AfD-leader Beatrix von Storch (Khan,  
2018a). 
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While Pakistani-born James converted to Catholicism (James, 2017), Pakistani-background 
Khan and Turkish-background Pirinçci embraced German nationalism (Khan, 2018a; Pirinçci, 
2019). Khan, an influential far-right vlogger close to the Institut für Staatspolitik, argues that 
Germany’s self-hate and focus on its tainted past impedes rather than facilitates integration of 
immigrants (Khan, 2018b). Formerly a successful writer of cat detective stories and now a 
regular speaker at Pegida events, Akif Pirinçci is known for his vulgar critique of German 
society. Calling himself “little Akif” (Pirinçci, 2019), he aims to break the taboos of political 
correctness to remind Germany that to defend itself it must be more self-loving. He laments that 
“Germans and the rest of the civilized are too weak” (Kaiser, 2016). 
The views presented by this network resonate with illiberal trends on the far right that 
argue for a spiritual strengthening of Germanness, either through the embrace of nationalism 
(Jongen, 2017) or Christianity (Lichtmesz, 2014). In its absolute anti-Islamism, this current 
overlaps with network two. Books published by representatives of network two are also popular 
in network four, and the illiberal far-right publisher and online bookseller Antaios sells Necla 
Kelek’s books. Networks three and four draw on the same tropes of illiberalism, arguing that a 
spiritual tradition is core to European civilization and necessary for the functioning of a nation. 
Unlike the rationalist branches of the far right, they do not see Islam as inferior to but rather as a 
force stronger than the liberal individualism that undermines German community and European 
culture. Networks three and four differ in their conclusions about what this means for German 
Islam. While network three argues that Muslim and German conservatism should come together 
to form a pragmatic alliance against liberal rationalism, network four argues that Muslims are a 
threat ready to invade a de-spirited Germany. 
The rejection or assimilation of Islam based on a spiritual understanding of Germanness 
echoes the shift in mainstream discussions of diversity from a focus on immigrants to Islam. This 
shift has allowed for an innovation on and mutation of the classical far-right idealization of “the 
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people” and “the nation”: while the people and the nation continue to function as the conceptual 
core, the reality of Germany as an immigration country (Müller, 2000) and the more visible 
presence of Islam have shifted them to new terrain. 
Conclusion 
Muslim-background public intellectuals and their ideas are now part and parcel of the 
German far right. They and their narratives actively shape the movement’s broad spectrum of 
exclusivist perspectives on Muslims and Islam. Their presence in far-right publications and 
events helps to legitimize the radicalization of more moderate right-wing audiences and to 
challenge the radical anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim positions of the far right. Intellectuals who 
build on the Germanness-as-rationality model  are mostly promoted by far right elites that 
embrace a liberal vision of Germanness, particularly in West Germany6, while networks that 
build on Germanness-as-s have a growing impact among those parts of the leadership that openly 
favour illiberal notions of Germanness, specifically in the East7. Drawing on competing 
traditions of Germanness, Muslim-background intellectuals’ arguments speak to the far right 
insofar as they underline the superiority of Germanness and the European civilization. While 
their positions towards Islam and Muslims differ fundamentally, these intellectuals promote a 
redemptive notion of a German nation embedded in a transnational European civilization aimed 
at overcoming feelings of guilt attached to the Holocaust (Özyürek, 2019) and enduring East-
West divisions (Krzyzowski & Nowicka, 2020) by either claiming a rational-liberal or spiritual-
illiberal community and its Judaeo-Christian legacy. This feeds into the far right’s dual goal of 
 
6 For example, AfD leaders as Beatrix von Storch and Jörg Meuthen  
have both openly embraced Ateş and Abdel-Samad. 
7 For example, the circles surrounding East German far right leader Björn Höcke  
and his close relationship to Muhesir Sebastian Hennig as well as the increasing 
influence and reach of Feroz Khan.  
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refashioning a positive identity for a unitary German people and preventing an assumed cultural 
decline. 
The diversity of actors and currents in the German far right lays bare the contradictory and 
arbitrary ways the movement responds to Islam, the driving the issue for the movement. 
Christianity and Islam have come to serve as a common matrix through which German 
identity—be it liberal-rational or illiberal-spiritual—is negotiated and defined. The Christian 
legacy of the secular-rational trope allows its protagonists to formulate affective and spiritual 
claims through a rational and individualist vocabulary and vice versa. The perception of 
Christianity and Islam as distinct traditions and their factual entanglement in right, left, and 
liberal traditions allows the German far right to merge spiritualist and rationalist elements of the 
movement in service of their discourses on Islam. Here, the contradictory use of both tropes is 
not an aberration of marginal politics but the expression of a widely shared basis for national and 
European identity, one with a long history. 
Muslim-background intellectuals are central to the construction of a purified white German 
identity and European ethnoculture that either excludes or includes Islam without threatening its 
own positive self-image. The liberal current does so by externalizing politics such as anti-
Semitism, sexism, fascism, and homophobia onto a Muslim other that needs to be transformed 
(Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009; Haritaworn, 2010; Özyürek, 2014). By embracing secularism as 
the “logical outcome” of a Judeo-Christian tradition, the far right can assert “our Christian 
culture” in more implicit ways and redeem the dark sides of Christian-European and German 
history (Anidjar, 2007: 49). In its reconciliatory and exclusivist versions, the rationalist German 
far right and its Muslim public intellectuals imagine Islam as an essentialized illiberal other that 
either must be overcome or Europeanized. At the centre of this rationalism is the spiritualisation 
of the individual choice to embrace a liberating notion of Germanness. In contrast, the illiberal 
strand aims either at asserting a positive and redemptive Euro-German identity so as to shape an 
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Islam that leaves positive myths of German selfhood untouched or openly calling for a Christian 
war on Islam. At the core of this spirituality is the rationalisation of a collective embrace of an 
illiberal-spiritual notion of Germanness. At the end of both tropes stands the yearning for 
belonging to a redemptive German identity that overcomes past guilt and present polarisation. 
Such creative use of the rational and spiritual tropes of Germanness opens up new 
possibilities for the German far right, both in the political mainstream and on the margins. 
Religious and political identities are used as prisms through which Germanness is defined. 
Employing multiple and seemingly contradictory definitions of Germanness may allow both for 
the celebration of “the people” or “the nation” in ways that do not threaten liberal ideals and 
pave the way for illiberal identity constructions. Through their contributions, Muslim-
background intellectuals are fundamental to these novel forms of far-right German identity 
construction in that they allow the movement to both rationalize a spiritual understanding of 
Germanness as a necessary developmental stage and spiritualize a rational conception of 
Germanness as redemptive. 
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